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Seeing the Forest Through the Trees: A Revealing
Look at Inherent Management Rights After the SERB
v. Youngstown City School District Board of Education
Decision and the Legislative Failure of 1995
MArr A. MAYER
"I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The
more you explain it, the more I don't understand it. ""*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1995, the Ohio State Employment Relations Board
(SERB) issued SERB v. Youngstown City School District Board of
Education' (Youngstown). The Youngstown decision addressed two
significant issues: (1) the determination of mandatory subjects2 of
bargaining3 and (2) the deference given to arbitration decisions by SERB.4
SERB's outcome on these two issues poses continued problems for state
public employers regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining,5 as well as
difficulties for both state public employers and unions with respect to
arbitration. 6 The good news for both state public employers and unions is
SECv. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,214(1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
112 OPER 1543, X-390 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board June 30, 1995).
2 Mandatory subjects of bargaining arc those subjects that require state public employers
to collectively bargain with the public employees' representative union over the actual
decision the state public employer wants to make. Typically, these issues include "rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 772,
772 (Charles J. Morris ed., 2d ed. 1983). In contrast to mandatory subjects of bargaining,
permissive subjects of bargaining are those subjects that state public employers can
unilaterally decide without collectively bargaining with the public employees' representative
union. See Id. at 894. However, for both mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, if
those subjects affect wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment, then public
employers and public employee representative unions must bargain over the "impact," or
"effect," of those subjects. See id.
3 See Yo:mgstown, 12 OPER . 1543, at X-391.
4 See id. at X_395.
5 See infra notes 133-177 and accompanying text.
6 Se Infra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
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that the section in the Youngstown decision that discussed SERB's deference
to arbitration is dicta7 and, as such, not binding precedent. 8 •
In addition to the two pitfalls created by SERB, state public employers
must also deal with a third issue, the legislative failure of 1995.9 In 1983,
the legislature gave life to the Collective Bargaining Act. 10 The vital part of
this act, which prevents state public employers from performing their jobs,
is the "affects" language 1 contained in Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.)
section 4117.08(C). 12 In 1995, it appeared that the legislature would amend
this provision, thereby giving state public employers the inherent
management rights they had so long awaited. 13 However, even with a
Republican majority in both the House and the Senate, as well as a
Republican Governor, the legislature failed to perform this much needed
surgery on the act. 14 As a result, state public employers must look to SERB
to tell them which inherent management rights are really theirs to
exercise.
15
This Note addresses the three areas of concern highlighted above. Part
II discusses the history of collective bargaining and the three parties
involved in state employment collective bargaining in Ohio. Part m[I
provides the recent history leading up to the Youngstown decision. Part IV
discusses SERB's past interpretation of the "affects" language from O.R.C.
section 4117.08(C), the balancing test created in the ODOT decision, the
adoption of the balancing test in the Youngstown decision 16 and a look at
statutory interpretation with an alternative interpretation other than the one
offered by SERB. Part V discusses the deference that SERB should give to
arbitration based on its own case law, on National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) case law and on public policy, in contrast to the extreme stance
SERB announced in the Youngstown decision. Part VI discusses the
7 Because the issues before SERB were confined to (1) whether or not Early Retirement
Incentive Plans were mandatory subjects of bargaining and (2) whether or not the
representative union waived its right to bargain, the other matters addressed by SERB carry
no binding authority. See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1 1543, at X-391. However, SERB's
discussion of those other matters could indicate SERB's position on those issues.
8 See Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., 638 N.E.2d 991, 994 (Ohio
1994).
9 See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
1 See infra note 175.
12 See infra note 33.
13 See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 148.
16 See infra notes 88 and 89.
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legislative failure that occurred in 1983 and that is occurring now. Finally,
Part VII concludes this Note by asserting that the Youngstown decision
continues to ignore the concept of inherent management rights and poses
potential problems for arbitration decision enforcement in Ohio, which,
when coupled with the legislature's failure to act, only perpetuates the
deficiencies connected with collective bargaining in Ohio.
I. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN OHIO
A. The Legislative Battle for Collective Bargaining: Patience,
Planning and Pay-off
In 1983, Ohio joined the twenty-five other states17 that had enacted
comprehensive collective bargaining legislation for its public employees.18
The legislature codified this legislation in O.R.C. chapter 4117, and
referred to it as the "Collective Bargaining Act." 19 For many years, labor
unions had attempted to persuade the state legislature to enact collective
bargaining legislation. 20 In 1975 and 1977, the labor unions succeeded in
getting collective bargaining statutes passed by the legislature. 21 However,
on both those occasions, Governor James Rhodes vetoed the legislation
before him.
2 2
Learning from these defeats, the labor unions realized that the only way
to insure passage of collective bargaining legislation required the election of
17 In 1983, states that offered full coverage of public employees via collective
bargaining acts included Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan. Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin; states that offered partial coverage for public
employees via collective bargaining acts included Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland. Nevada, North Dakota. Oklahoma. Tennessee, Texas,
Washington and Wyoming; and states that offered no coverage to public employees included
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia. See Calvin W. Sharpe, The Ohio Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Law: First Anniversary Colloquium, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 345,
349 (1985).
18 See Note, Public Employee Collective Bargaining Becomes a Matter of Right in Ohio,
13 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 219-221 (1983).
19 See James T. O'Reilly, More Magic with Less Smoke: A Ten Year Retrospective on
Ohio's Collective Bargaining Law. 19 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 1. 1 (1993).
20 See id. at 2-3.
21 See Id.
2 2 See id. at2.
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a governor and legislators sympathetic to their position.23 The two key
figures that eventually helped enact O.R.C. chapter 4117 were Governor
Richard F. Celeste and Senator Eugene Branstool. 24 The critics of the labor
unions pointed to the large contributions made to both Governor Celeste's
campaign and Senator Branstool's campaign as evidence of union
influence. 25 The unions contributed approximately $1,000,000 to Celeste's
campaign coffers and $43,000 to Branstool's campaign coffers. 26 Other pro-
union legislators received contributions from the labor unions as well. 27 Not
surprisingly, on July 6, 1983, the labor unions recouped their investment
when Governor Celeste signed Amended Substitute Senate Bill 133 into
law.
28
During the drafting of O.R.C. chapter 4117, the Ohio legislators
looked to the collective bargaining laws in both Michigan and Pennsylvania
for guidance.2 9 Referencing the Michigan and Pennsylvania collective
bargaining acts enabled the pro-union Ohio legislative drafters to discern
what provisions did and did not benefit the labor unions in Michigan and
Pennsylvania. Thus, a strong presumption can be made that the pro-union
Ohio legislative drafters utilized language from the Michigan and
Pennsylvania statutes in O.R.C. chapter 4117 that favored the Ohio labor
unions. 3
0
In a survey involving labor union representatives, union comments
ranged from "there's no place I'd rather be" to "the cream, at the top"
when referencing O.R.C. chapter 4117.31 As illustrated by this Note, the
pro-union legislative drafters accomplished what they intended to do-
Ohio's collective bargaining act is notably slanted in favor of the labor
unions.
Early on, it became apparent that one of the key areas of conflict
revolved around the language in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C).32 Specifically,
the first part of the aforementioned provision (O.R.C. section
23 See id. at3.
24 See id.
25 See James T. O'Reilly & Neil Gath, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective
Bargaining Law for Public Employees, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 894 (1983).
26 See id. at 894 n.39.
27 See O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 3.
28 See O'Reilly & Gath, supra note 25, at 894, 895. The Democrat-majority Senate
passed the legislation along party lines by a vote of 17 for and 16 against. See id. at 894 n.38.
29 See O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 28.
3 0 See id.
31 Id. at28 n.205.
32 See Note, supra note 18, at 234.
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4117.08(C)(1)-(9)) took inherent management rights away from the
bargaining table,34 while the second part of the provision (the "affects"
language)35 seemed to place those inherent management rights back on the
bargaining table.36 As a result, the legislation as written did not seem to
secure any true inherent management rights. 37 In the years following
passage of O.R.C. chapter 4117, SERB's several attempts at interpreting
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) have affirmed this very concern. 38
B. The Triunvirate and the Distribution of Responsibilities
O.R.C. chapter 4117 is a comprehensive statute that creates and
empowers the three entities necessary for successful operation of the
33 O.R.C. § 4117.08(C) states in pertinent part:
Unless a public employer agrees otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement, nothing
in Chapter 411Z of the Revised Code impairs the right and responsibility of ead public
employer to:
(1) Detendne matters of inherent managerial policy which include, but are not limited to
areas of discretion or policy such as the functions and programs of the public employer,
standards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, and organizational
structure;
(2) Direct, supervise, evaluate, or hire employees;
(3) Maintain and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental operations;
(4) Determine the overall methods, process, means, or personnel by which governmental
operations are to be conducted;
(5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause, or lay off, transfer, assign,
schedule, promote, or retain employees;
(6) Determine the adequacy of the work force;
(7) Determine the overall mission of the employer as a unit of government;
(8) Effectively manage the work force;
(9) Take actions to carry out the mission of the public employer as a governmental unit.
The employer is not required to bargain on subjects reserved to the management and
direction of the governmental unit except as affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of
employment.
OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 4117.08(C) (Baldwin 1995) (emphasis added).
34 See Note, supra note 18, at 235; see also supra note 33.
3 5 See Infra note 175.
36 See Note, supra note 18, at 235-236; see also supra note 33.
3 7 See T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr. & Keith A. Ashmus, Public Sector Bargaining in a
Democracy An Assessment of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law, 33 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 593, 638 (1986).
38 See infra notes 133-177 and accompanying text.
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Collective Bargaining Act.39 The statute also defines the responsibilities of
each of those entities.40 The first entity, SERB, began with the appointment
of three members to the Board by the governor, and subsequently consented
to by the Senate.4 1 The statute requires a certain level of expertise by the
three board members in the area of labor relations or personnel practices.
4 2
Because the governor appoints the board members, no more than two board
members from the same political party can serve simultaneously. 43 The
statute also prohibits any conflicts of interest by sitting board members.44 in
order to fulfill their statutory responsibilities, the statute charges the board
members with appointing an executive director, attorneys, examiners,
mediators, arbitrators, fact-finding panels and other necessary employees.
45
The statute prescribes that SERB's responsibilities include writing an annual
report of its activity to the governor and legislature,4 6 holding hearings on
labor-manag.ement matters and training representatives from both labor and
management on the rules and regulations, as well as other stated
responsibilities.
47
Likewise, the statute creates the Office of Collective Bargaining
(OCB). 48 OCB represents the state public employers in most labor matters49
covered under O.R.C. chapter 4117.50 Although not expressly outlined by
the statute, OCB consists of a deputy director, a chief counsel with staff and
a chief of operations with staff.5 1 The responsibilities of OCB involve
39 See infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
40 See id.
41 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(A) (Baldwin 1995). In light of this, the
appointing governor is able to appoint members who are sympathetic to the position of that
governor in the area of labor-management issues. Hence, Governor Celeste appointed two
pro-union members to interpret the already pro-union statute. Ironically, one of Governor
Celeste's appointees, SERB Chairman Jack Day, interpreted O.R.C. § 4117.08(C) as
advocated in this Note. See infra notes 167-177 and accompanying text.
4 2 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(A) (Baldwin 1995).
43 See id.
44 See id.
4 5 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(E) (Baldwin 1995).
4 6 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(C) (Baldwin 1995).
4 7 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(H) (Baldwin 1995).
4 8 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(D) (Baldwin 1995).
49 In accordance with O.R.C. § 2743.14, the Attorney General's office represents the
state public employers in all formal court actions. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.14
(Baldwin 1995).
50 See id.
51 See Interview with Richard J. Mattera, Legal Intern for the Office of Collective
Bargaining, in Columbus, Ohio (December 14, 1995) (on file with author).
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assisting the director in formulating and implementing policies;
5 2
negotiating and entering into agreements with the various unions that
represent the public employees;5 3 coordinating the mediation hearings, fact-
finding panels and arbitration cases; 54 preparing for negotiations 5  and
writing an annual report of its activity to the governor and legislature.
5 6
Finally, the statute provides for the representation of the various state
public employees by unions.57 Because unions are private entities, the
statute does not actually create the unions, but allows unions to become the.
exclusive representatives of certain groups of public employees. 58 First, the
statute lists the rights of state public employees.5 9 In order to protect those
rights, the statute provides an election procedure that allows a group of state
public employees to vote for the union that they want to represent them in
collective bargaining matters.60 Once the state public employees select a
representative by a majority vote, SERB certifies that union as the exclusive
representative of those state public employees. 61 Last, the statute lists the
rights of the exclusive representative.
62
Currently, five unions exclusively represent the various state public
employees. 63 These state public employees operate under seven contracts
negotiated between OCB and the respective exclusive representatives. 64
When an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) arises, SERB adjudicates the issue
between the two parties.65
52 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(D)(1) (Baldwin 1995).
53 See OHIo REV. CODEANN. § 4117.10(D)(2) (Baldwin 1995).
S4 See OHtO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.100E)(3) (Baldwin 1995).
55 See OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.10(D)(4)-(5) (Baldwin 1995).
56 See OHIO REv. CODEANN. § 4117.10(D)(6) (Baldwin 1995).
57 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
59 See id.
59 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.03(A)(1)-(5) (Baldwin 1995).
60 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.07 (Baldwin 1995).
61 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.05-.06 (Baldwin 1995).
6 2 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.04 (Baldwin 1995).
63 These unions include: (1) the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 11, AFL-CIO;
(2) District 1199, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO; (3) the United Food &
Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO; (4) the State Council of Professional Educators, Ohio
Education Association/National Education Association and (5) Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio
Labor Council, Inc.
64 One contract covers each union with the exception of the Fraternal Order of Police,
who operate under three separate contracts for Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 15. The contracts
cover three years and are replaced by a new contract after each round of bargaining.
65 See supra note 47.
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III. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE YouNGSTOw DECISION
The Youngstown case evolved from a dispute between the Youngstown
City School District Board of Education (Board of Education) and the
Youngstown Education Association (YEA) over Early Retirement Incentive
Plans (ERIP).66 In December of 1992, the Board of Education began
bargaining with administrative employees to create a new ERIP to facilitate
the downsizing of the administrative employees. 67 The administrative
employees belonged to the Youngstown Association of Administrative and
Supervisory Personnel (ASP). 68
After several bargaining sessions, the Board of Education reached an
agreement with ASP on an ERIP. 69 In accordance with O.R.C. section
3307.35,70 the Board of Education extended the ERIP with the same terms
to YEA members under Board Resolution No. I8-93.7 1 The Board of
Education did this unilaterally without notice to, or negotiation with,
YEA. 72 After the unilateral extension to YEA members, the Board of
Education offered to bargain the effects of Board Resolution No. 18-93 with
YEA. 73
In response, YEA requested that the Board of Education cease and
desist implementation of the ERIP and demanded that the Board of
Education bargain with YEA over the downsizing decision. 74 The Board of
Education refused to comply with YEA's request.75 Because the Board of
Education had effectively adopted and offered the ERIP to YEA members,
YEA decided not to engage in effects bargaining.
76




70 O.R.C. § 3307.35 reads in pertinent part:
Participation in the plan shall be available to all eligible employees except that the
employer may limit the number of persons for whom it purchases credit in any calendar
year to a specified percentage of its employees who are members of the state teachers
retirement system on the first day of January of that year.
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.35 (Baldwin 1995), amended by 1996 Ohio Legis. Serv.
L-2069 (Baldwin).
71 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 11543, at X-391-392.




7 6 See id.
[Vol. 12:2 1997]
SEEING THE FOREST THROUGH THE TREES
Instead, YEA filed a ULP charge with SERB and a grievance with the
Board of Education.77 An arbitration award settled the grievance by
requiring the Board of Education to negotiate with YEA over an ERIP with
terms better than or equal to the ERIP with ASP. 78 In spite of the
arbitration award, SERB issued a finding of probable cause that the Board
of Education had committed an unfair labor practice. 79 SERB issued a
complaint, and shortly thereafter, a hearing took place before a SERB
hearing officer.
80
In the Proposed Order, the Hearing Officer concluded that the Board of
Education had violated O.R.C. sections 4117.11(A)(1) 8 1 and (5)82 by
implementing the ERIP with YEA members without giving notice to, or
negotiating with, YEA.83 The Board of Education filed exceptions to the
Hearing Officer's Proposed Order. The SERB Board then heard the case.
84
After the hearing, SERB issued the Youngstown decision.8 - For
purposes of this Note, only the two aforementioned aspects of the
Youngstown decision-determining mandatory subjects of bargaining and
giving deference to arbitration decisions-will be discussed.
In the Youngstown decision, SERB attempts to interpret O.R.C. section
4117.08(C)(1)-(9), 8 6 which delineates specific areas of inherent management
rights. SERB's interpretation of O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) results in the






81 A violation of O.R.C. § 4117.11(A)(1) occurs when an employer "ilnterfere[s] with,
restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Chapter 4117 of
the Revised Code or an employee organization in the selection of its representative for
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.11(A)(1) (Baldwin 1995).
82 A violation of O.R.C. § 4117.11(A)(5) occurs when an employer "[r]efuse[s] to
bargain collectively with the representative of his employees recognized as the exclusive
representative or certified pursuant to Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code." OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4117.11(A)(5) (Baldwin 1995).
83 See Youngsrown, 12 OPER 1543, at X-392.
84 See Id.
85 See id.
86 See supra note 33.
8 7 See infra note 128.
8 8 The only difference between the balancing test in the Youmgstown decision and the
balancing test in the ODOT decision is that the Youngstown balancing test drops the third
prong of the ODOT balancing test. This third prong considered the "extent to which the
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previously elucidated in the SERB v. Ohio Department of Transportation89
(OD07) decision. This balancing test gives an ineffectual" reading to
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9) because, according to SERB's
interpretation in the Youngstown decision, "the first sentence of this clause
[O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9)] gives, but the second takes away [the
"affects" language]."9 1
SERB's interpretation in the Youngstown decision is a semantic sleight
of hand intended to give the appearance that one side (management) gained
something and the other side (unions) lost something. In fact, no such gain
or loss really occurred by SERB's interpretation in the Youngstown
decision. 92 The first critics of the 1983 Act93 expressed concern that "too
many issues could be moved from management prerogatives to bargainable
issues" 94 because of the language in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C). After
thirteen years of continual conflict over the correct interpretation of O.R.C.
section 4117.08(C), 95 SERB still ignores the basic concept that interpreting
the "affects" language as it does, renders all of the language prior to that
one word ineffectual. 96 Hence, state public employers still cannot make a
decision without being second guessed by either a union or SERB.
In addition, SERB's assertion in the Youngstown decision that it is not
bound by an arbitrator's decision97 is against relevant case law and public
policy. This position- eliminates incentives for parties to bargain and enter
subject matter had been addressed or preempted by legislation." ODOT, 10 OPER 1262, at
X-200 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board April 29, 1993). SERB expressly notes in the
Youngstown decision that it is "axiomatic" that the legislature can preempt a SERB
determination. See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1 1543, at X-397 n.7. This conclusion effectively
states the obvious, and notes the superfluous nature of a statutory prong.
89 Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 11, AFL-CIO v. Ohio
Department of Transportation, 10 OPER 1262, X-196 (Ohio State Employment Relations
Board April 29, 1993), vacated as moor, 12 OPER 1476, X-342 (Oh. Ct. App., 10th Dist.,
1995).
90 "Ineffectual" here and throughout this article refers to the interpretation as it fails to
protect the inherent management rights of state public employers. Unions, to the contrary,
would see the interpretation as highly effective because it allows unions, at a minimum, to
challenge every decision a state public employer makes.
9 1 JAMEs T. O'REILLY, OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 205 (2d ed.
1992); see also supra note 33.
92 See infra note 148.
93 See generally supra note 19.
94 O'REILLY, supra note 91, at 52.
95 See infra notes 133-177 and accompanying text.
96 See infra note 148.
97 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1 1543, at X-395.
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into binding arbitration because SERB can disregard the arbitrator's
decision at its own whim. 98 Although this position is dicta, it may indicate
how SERB will decide future cases, and so it should concern both state
public employers and unions.
IV. DETERMINING MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING WHILE
PRESERVING INHERENT MANAGEMENT RIGHTS-AN
OXYMORON IN OHIO
When a sports team follows a year in which it posted a 2-14 record
with a 6-10 record, many will cite the four game improvement as evidence
of the team's "success." Others will note that the team still needs to win at
least four games to make the playoffs. Similarly, because the 1986 SERB v.
Lorain City School District Board of Education99 (Lorain) and the 1988
SERB. v. City of Lakewood130 (Lakewood) decisions emasculated inherent
management rights so thoroughly, ODOT and Youngstown are steps in the
right direction, but, like the 6-10 sports team, SERB will have to do much
better to reach the "playoffs."
A. Inherent Management Rights Forgotten: Lorain and Lakewood
In the Lorain decision,10 a 2-1 SERB majority held that the "affects"
language of O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) required state public employers to
bargain102 with the unions over any decision that "affected" wages, hours or
terms and conditions of employment. 03 As can be easily recognized,
virtually every decision by state public employers will "affect" wages,
hours or terms and conditions of employment. 104 This public employer's
worst nightmare is exactly what happened over the next several years as
evidenced by the Lakewood °5 decision.
In Lakewood, SERB held that "when a matter 'affects' wages, hours,
terms and other conditions of employment, that matter is subject to
98 See infra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
99 3 OPER 3064, VI-129 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board May 15, 1986),
af'd, Lorain City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. SERB (Lorain 11), 533 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1988).
100 5 OPER 5513, X-403 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board July 11, 1988).
101 3 OPER 3064, VII-129 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board May 15, 1986).
102 "Bargain" in this context refers to decision bargaining, not effects bargaining, which
may be required independently of whether the subject in contention is mandatory or
permissive in nature.
103 See O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 11.
104 See Id.
105 See generally Lakewood, 5 OPER 5513, at X-403.
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bargaining."' 1 6 SERB noted that the "affects" language of O.R.C. section
4117.08(C) must be given effect. 107 As a result, SERB interpreted the last
clause in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) to curtail the previously delineated
management rights listed in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9).10 8 This
interpretation is somewhat problematic because it essentially allows one
word to negate a significant number of words before it.10 9 Although this
could have been the intent of the pro-union drafters, 110 that intent is
irrelevant when interpreting the statute to give effect to all the words-not
just the one word that suits a specific political agenda.
111
To make matters worse for state public employers, the Supreme Court
of Ohio affirmed SERB's ineffectual interpretation of the "affects" language
in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C). 112 In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that "where the exercise of a management right causes a change
in or 'affects' working conditions or terms of a contract, then the decision
to exercise that right is a mandatory subject of bargaining."113 The Supreme
Court of Ohio noted a trend in other states to support SERB's interpretation
of Ohio's collective bargaining statute. 114 Hence, as far as SERB and the
Supreme Court of Ohio were concerned, the concept of inherent
management rights that allowed state public employers to act without fear of
being challenged by a union was nonexistent.
115
The reaction to the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision differed
drastically between state public employers and unions. 116 State public
employers criticized the decision because it further weakened their position,
while unions applauded the decision as a correct transfer of power.117 Thus,
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) became the battleground in the Ohio labor
movement.
'06 Id. at X-404.
107 See id.
108 See id.; see also supra note 33.
109 See supra note 33.
110 See infra notes 156-177 and accompanying text.
111 As noted by Jacquelin F. Drucker, a labor law expert, "[t]he word 'affect' was
carefully chosen and deliberately designed to require public employers to bargain over a very
broad range of issues." Stephen Phillips, Wading into Battle over Bargaining Law, THE PLAIN
DEALER, June 16, 1996, at A20.




115 See O'REILLY, supra note 91, at 49.
116 See O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 12.
117 See id.
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B. Semantic Sleight of Hand I: ODOT
Several major changes occurred in Ohio after the Supreme Court of
Ohio's decision affirming SERB's ineffectual interpretation of O.R.C.
section 4117.08(C). The most important change came when Ohio elected
George V. Voinovich, a Republican, as its governor in 1990.118 With the
1990 election victory came the second key change-the power of the new
governor to appoint more moderate, pro-management members to the
expiring terms at SERB. 119 The final key change came with the Republican
wins in the legislature in 1994.120 These changes allowed for a return to
management of the inherent rights it should have received back in 1983.
Although some would argue to the contrary, this Note will illustrate that the
proper return of inherent rights to management has not yet occurred.
In the 1993 ODOT decision, SERB revisited the "affects" language in
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C). 121 ODOT transpired because the Ohio
Department of Transportation unilaterally implemented a non-smoking
policy in its facilities. 122 The union, OCSEA/AFSCME, filed a complaint
alleging violation of O.R.C. section 4117.11(A)(1)123 and (5).124 The
Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of the complaint, and the union
appealed to the SERB Board. t25 The SERB Board granted a hearing.
In its decision, SERB semantically changed its tune as compared to the
Lorain and Lakewood decisions by noting that the interpretations in Lorain
and Lakewood "virtually eliminated the concept of management rights
[which was] not contemplated by the law itself."' 26 SERB then set out to
reconcile the statutory language with the "reality of public sector




120 See Roger K. Lowe, Republicans Can Expect to Make Gains in Ohio Elections, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1994, at 7A.
121 See generally ODOT, 10 OPER 1262, X-196 (Ohio State Employment Relations
Board April 29, 1993).
122 See Id. at X-197.
123 See id. at X-196; see also supra note 81.
124 See ODOT, 10 OPER 11262, at X-196; see also supra note 82.
125 See ODOT, 10 OPER 1 1262, at X-197.
126 Id. at X-198.
127 rd.
128 SERB stated the balancing test as follows:
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 12:2 1997]
In June of 1995, the Court of Appeals for the 10th District vacated
SERB's ODOT decision on the grounds of mootness. 129 The Court of
Appeals held that because Governor Voinovich had issued an executive
order1 30 that prohibited smoking in most state facilities, the point became
moot. 13 1 Therefore, the ODOT balancing test no longer provided guidance
for state public employers or unions. Fortunately for SERB, the
Youngstown case provided the opportunity to revive the ODOT balancing
test. 132
C. Semantic Sleight of Hand II. Youngstown
Less than a month after the Court of Appeals vacated the ODOT
decision, SERB issued the Youngstown decision. 133 In the Youngstown
decision, SERB adopted the ODOT balancing test minus the superfluous
[I]f a given subject is alleged to affect and is determined to have a material influence
upon wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment and involves the exercise of
inherent management discretion, to determine whether it is a mandatory subject of
bargaining, we will weigh:
(1) the extent to which the subject is logically and reasonably related to wages, hours,
terms and other conditions of employment;
(2) the extent to which the employer's obligation to negotiate may significantly abridge
its freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives set forth in and anticipated by
O.R.C. § 4117.08(C), including an examination of the type of employer involved and
whether inherent discretion on the subject matter at issue is necessary to achieve the
employer's essential mission and obligations to the general public;
(3) the extent to which the subject matter had been addressed or preempted by
legislation; and
(4) the extent to which the mediatory influence of collective bargaining and, when
necessary, any impasse resolution mechanisms available to the parties, are the
appropriate means of resolving conflicts over the subject matter.
ODOT, 10 OPER 1262, at X-199.
12 9 See ODOT, 12 OPER 1476, at X-343.
130 Executive Order 93-OIV prohibited smoking in most state facilities, including the
Ohio Department of Transportation building. See id.
131 See id. at X-344.
132 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1543, at X-390.
133 See id.
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third prong134 that dealt with issues of legislative preemption. 135 Hence, the
new balancing test now consists of three prongs.
136
Functionally, SERB applies the contested decision to the pre-test clause
in the balancing test to determine if balancing is appropriate.' 37 If balancing
is not appropriate, then the decision is deemed a permissive subject of
bargaining 38 that only requires the public employer to bargain over the
effects of the decision; 139 if balancing is appropriate, then the decision is
evaluated under the balancing test.140 Because this Note does not consider
the application of the balancing test as a measuring device but only
considers the effect of the balancing test's existence on the concept of
inherent management rights,' 4 ' an exhaustive analysis of each prong of the
balancing test will not be undertaken.1
42
As noted above in the ODOT decision (an inspection of the decisions
will reveal the similarity in language between the ODOT and Youngstown
decisions), 43 SERB proports to reject both Lorain and Lakewood in favor
of the balancing test which SERB deems more "consistent with the
presumed intention of the legislative enactments." 44 Although likely to be
134 See id. at X-397 n.7.
135 See supra note 88.
136 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1 1543, at X-393-X-394.
137 The pre-test clause reads as follows:
[qf a given subject is alleged to affect and is determined to have a material influence
upon wages, hours, or terms and other conditions of employment and involves the
exercise of inherent management discretion, the following factors must be balanced to
determine whether it is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining.
Youngstown, 12 OPER 1543, at X-393.
138 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1 1543, at X-393-X-394.
139 See supra note 2.
140 See id.
141 By virtue of the balancing test, state public employer powers are lessened because
instead of having total control over the areas outlined in O.R.C. § 4117.08(C)(1)-(9), once a
union files a ULP, state public employers must go before SERB to find out if their action is an
inherent management right.
142 In the decision In re City of Canton, 11 OPER 1 1433, X-321 (Ohio State
Employment Relations Board June 29, 1994). SERB utilized a balancing test. Even though
SERB applied the ODOT balancing test (with the statutory third prong), the case accurately
illustrates how a balancing test works. For all intents and purposes, the result would be the
same under the Youngstown balancing test.
143 Compare Youngstown, 12 OPER 11543, at X-390 with ODOT, 10 OPER 1262, at
X-196.
144 Youngstown, 12 OPER 11543. at X-394.
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true, the balancing test still provides "fertile ground"1 45 for SERB to
declare what is or is not an inherent management right. This construction
continues to read the "affects" language in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) as
the tail that wags the entire provisional dog.
In effect, the balancing test requires a case-by-case inquiry "rather than
a specific definition which clearly delineates management prerogatives from
mandatory subjects of bargaining." 146 Hence, like the outcome under the
Lorain and Lakewood standard, state public employers after ODOT remain
unable to act with any degree of confidence. 147
Although the ODOT and the Youngstown decisions give much-needed
encouragement to state public employers, further analysis of the balancing
test shows that such an interpretation still does not recognize the existence
of any inherent management rights.148 Functionally, unions can still
challenge all public employer decisions. 149 Therefore, SERB could continue
145 See John F. Lewis et al., Lessons To Be Learned from the Ohio Experience: A
Management Perspective, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 269, 300 (1989) (noting that the phrase "terms
and conditions of employment" allows for an expansive interpretation of O.R.C.
§ 4117.08(C)).
146 Nicholas A. Pittner et al., Public Employee Collective Bargaining and Ohio State
Public Employers: A New Perspective, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 719, 757 (1986).
147 See O'RatLLY, supra note 91, at 49.
148 Again, state public employers must have some management rights that are inherent
in their proper functioning that are beyond the reach of unions to challenge. Logically and
linguistically, every management decision will affect wages, hours, or terms and conditions of
employment. SERB concluded this much in both Lorain and Lakewood. So stated, state public
employers have no rights. However, this cannot be the case,. for O.R.C. § 4117.08(C)(1)-(9)
lists numerous areas of inherent management discretion. SERB's ineffectual interpretation of
this provision stripped these rights from management, and simply hiding behind the guise of a
new, high-fangled balancing test still fails to cordon off even one inherent management right
to state public employers. This Note rhetorically asks: Are there any inherent management
rights? The initial conclusion seems to indicate that as SERB goes, so go inherent management
rights. Only time and legislative inaction will give us the answer.
149 See supra note 128. The language in the balancing test ("If a given subject is alleged
to affect . . .") (emphasis added) clearly opens Pandora's box for the unions to challenge
every management decision.
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to find any inherent management right a mandatory subject of bargaining,150
and so, public employer decisions remain subject to the whim of SERB.
151
In the Youngstown decision, SERB goes to great lengths to point out
the adoption of balancing tests by other states which have collective
bargaining statutes.152 Although other states do utilize balancing tests to
differentiate between mandatory subjects of bargaining and inherent
management rights, such use does not validate or vindicate balancing tests
as the only or ideal solution.
153
In all fairness to SERB, little can be done beyond a legislative change
to give inherent management rights to state public employers. Because of
the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Lorain II,1' any action by SERB
not remotely adhering to that holding would in all likelihood be reversed by
the Supreme Court of Ohio. The chances of the Supreme Court of Ohio
violating the principle of stare decisis55 and disregarding a seven-year-old
precedent is highly unlikely. Therefore, SERB's own hands are tied, and the
Youngstown decision may be viewed as SERB's attempt to push the
Supreme Court of Ohio's Lorain 1I holding as far as reasonably permissible.
150 See supra note 128. Intuitively, the very existence of a balancing test means that
SERB will either find the balancing test inapplicable or find the balancing test applicable.
Regardless, the fate of a public employees decision lies with SERB. Hence, second-guessing
SERB will become the focus of state public employers.
151 In SERB v. Department of Youth Services, 13 OPER 1 1397, X-303 (Ohio State
Employment Relations Board April 26, 1996), SERB recently used the Youngstown balancing
test to find that a public employer committed a ULP by implementing a decision without first
bargaining over the decision and the effect of that decision. See DYS, 13 OPER. 11397, at X-
305-X-307. This case accurately demonstrates the contradiction created when SERB first
incorrectly interpreted O.R.C. § 4117.08(C).
152 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1543, at X-394. SERB cites the balancing tests used by
the NLRB, California, Illinois and Pennsylvania in support of its position. See generally
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5) & 8(d) (Baldwin 1995) (as interpreted in First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)); California Government Code § 3543.2(a)
(as interpreted in San Mareo School Dist. v. PERB, 663 P.2d 523 (Cal. 1983)); Illinois
Compiled Statute 31514 (as interpreted in Central City Educ. Assoc., IEAINEA v. IELRB, 599
N.E.2d 892 (I1. 1992)); Pennsylvania Statute § 1101.702 (as interpreted in PLRB v. State
College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975)).
153 Beyond the internal problems of O.R.C. § 4117.08(C), public employers must also
deal with SERB's sleights of hand via the balancing test.
154 See stpra note 99.
155 The principle of stare decisis compels adjudicatory bodies to abide by, or adhere to,
decided cases.
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D. Statutory Interpretation: Giving Words Equal Effect
In the Youngstown decision, SERB explores the exercise of statutory
interpretation. 156 SERB notes that "words should not be ignored or deleted,
and such words must be presumed to have had an intended meaning if one
can be found." 157 SERB also states that the interpretation "must balance the
right of employers to run the public business with the right of their
employees to engage in collective bargaining." 158 Seemingly in accordance
with the guidelines issued in SERB v. Belmont County Engineer
159
(Belmont), SERB interprets O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) by creating the
aforementioned Youngstown balancing test.
160
In Belmont, the majority correctly noted that "in interpreting a
legislative enactment, the courts may not simply rewrite it on the basis that
they are thereby improving the law, or write what they consider better acts,
or read into a statute that which is not found there." 161 An analysis of
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) reveals that SERB's interpretation of that
subsection in the Youngstown decision violates the Belmont decision's
guidelines. Specifically, SERB seems to read "into a statute that which is
not found there." 162 By giving more weight to the "affects" language in
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) than to the preceding language in O.R.C.
section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9), SERB erroneously concludes that the statute's
language attempts to balance inherent management rights against mandatory
subjects of bargaining.
When interpreting statutes, interpreting bodies should place an
emphasis on adherence to the statutory text. 163 United States Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia maintains that the "subjectivity of the search for
intent . . . gives judges more discretion than they should have under our
system of government."164
The key point of contention in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) is the much
noted "affects" language. This contention surfaced as a result of a political
156 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 11543, at X-392-X-395.
157 Id. at X-393.
15 8 Id.
159 6 OPER 1 6273, X-311 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board January 25, 1986).
160 See Youngstown, 12 OPER 1543, at X-393-X-394.
161 Belmont, 6 OPER 6273, at X-312.
162 See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
163 See James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and
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pay-back by the legislature. 165 As noted by the majority in the Lorain II
decision, the legislature chose to use "affect," rather than "effect"-a verb,
rather than a noun. 16  Because the legislature used "affect," SERB must
read the statute to give that language effect. However, this necessity does
not require SERB to give the "affects" language greater weight than the
inherent management rights language preceding it. Rather, SERB should
interpret O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) in light of all the language and by so
doing give equal weight to all the language in the subsection. This method
is the only way faithfully to effectuate the entire subsection.
In the dissenting opinions from both Lorain decisions, SERB Chairman
Jack Day and Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer properly
interpreted O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) to effectuate the entire subsection.
167
Chairman Day, on examining O.R.C. section 4117.08(C), noted the
following:
At first blush it would appear that the listing of subjects for which
bargaining is not mandatory [i.e., O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9)],
coupled with the caveat that the non-mandatory subjects may be
bargainable if they "affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of
employment," poses a contradiction. However, there is a rationale
which resolves the seeming contrariety. That rationale would permit
management to exercise the listed prerogatives unilaterally but
requires bargaining on the effects of that exercise.
168
Chief Justice Moyer agreed with this interpretation on appeal, and noted
that it "gives effect to the plain meaning of the words used therein,
preserves the rights of management to determine the means or personnel by
which its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement are to be
achieved, and protects the bargaining rights of the bargaining unit
members."
169
Furthermore, Chairman Day's interpretation accomplishes two things.
First, it recognizes the concept of inherent management rights as explicitly
stated in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9). 170 Second, it recognizes that
O.R.C. section 4117.08(A)171 covers non-inherent management rights
165 See supra note I11.
166 See Lorain ll, 533 N.E.2d at 268.
167 See Lorain II, 533 N.E.2d at 269-270; Lorain, 3 OPER 3064, at VII-131.
168 Lorain, 3 OPER 3064, at VII-13 1.
16 9 Loran 11, 533 N.E.2d at 270.
170 See supra note 33.
171 O.R.C. § 4117.08(A) reads in pertinent part:
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which are subject to both decision nd effects bargaining. This recognition
of O.R.C. section 4117.08(A) leaves the "affects" language to cover the
effects bargaining, which must occur when inherent management rights
"affect" wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment-an area not
covered expressly anywhere else in O.R.C. chapter 4117.172
This interpretation is best illustrated by a Venn diagram 73 with one
circle representing mandatory bargaining subjects and another circle
representing inherent management rights. The two circles overlap each other
indicating that (1) non-inherent management rights matters are subject to
decision and effects bargaining (this gives O.R.C. section 4117.08(A)
effect), 174 (2) inherent management rights matters are subject to effects
bargaining (this gives the O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) "affects" language
effect) 175 and (3) inherent management rights matters are not subject to
decision bargaining (this gives O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9) effect). 176
In light of the above, the Youngstown decision illustrates a semantic
sleight of hand. By expressly rejecting both Lorain and Lakewood, SERB
appears to move to the center, but as this Note demonstrates, the ultimate
question pertaining to the existence of inherent management rights that are
beyond the reach of either SERB or the unions to challenge remains
All matters pertaining to wages, hours, or terms and other conditions of employment and
the continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision of a collective
bargaining agreement are subject to collective bargaining betyween the public employer
and the exclusive representative, except as otherwise specified in this section.
OHtO Ray. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(A) (Baldwin 1995).
172 See O.R.C. § 4117.08 (Baldwin 1995).
173 The left circle represents mandatory subjects of bargaining, and the right circle
represents inherent management rights.
1 2 3
174 Seesupra notes 171 and 173.
175 See supra note 173. The "affects" language of O.R.C. § 4117.08(C) reads in
pertinent part: "The employer is not required to bargain on subjects reserved to the
management and direction of the governmental unit except as affect wages, hours, terms and
conditions of employment." Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C) (Baldwin 1995) (emphasis
added).
176 See supra notes 33 and 173.
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dubious. Thus, SERB's movement toward inherent management rights is de
minimis.177 The only interpretation of O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) that
properly effectuates the entire provision is the interpretation offered by
Chairman Day and Chief Justice Moyer.
V. WHY DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATION DECISIONS IS REQUIRED
Arbitration is only binding if courts enforce the arbitration decision.
Without court deference, arbitration becomes a futile, worthless activity. In
the Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Oszust178 decision, the Supreme
Court of Ohio succinctly elucidated the rationale behind arbitration:
[Tihe very purpose of arbitration 'is to reach a final disposition of the
controversy between them, and to avoid future litigation of the same
matters.' ... [The] arbitrator's authority is confined to the resolution
of issues submitted regarding contractual rights. The arbitrator is
bound to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement in
accordance with instructions from the parties to the agreement.
179
Therefore, absent an overriding public policy reason, the usefulness of
arbitration is weakened if a court allows subsequent proceedings on the
matter settled by the arbitration decision.18 0 Also, subsequent meddling by
courts tends to reduce the incentive both parties have to arbitrate a
dispute.181
In the Youngstown decision, SERB emphatically states that it is "not
legally bound to accept an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract. .. [nor
is it] compelled to give deference to an arbitrator's award." 18 2 SERB refers
the reader to no case law in support of its position, nor does SERB offer
any justification for such a position. 183 In fact, SERB and NLRB case law,
177 This phrase means small or minimal. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
178 491 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1986).
179 Id. at 299-300 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964) (alteration in original).
180 See 18 CHARLES A. WRIrHT elr AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4475 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
181 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
182 Youngstown, 12 OPER 11543, at X-395.
183 SERB does cite SERB v. East Palestine City Sch. Dist. Rd. of Educ., 5 OPER
5777, X-635 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board June 29, 1988), to support its
conclusion. However, that case stands for the proposition that in situations where SERB
makes a decision which is appealed, the appellate courts must give deference to SERB's
decision. The court stated that "[courts... are required to give due deference to an
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as well as public policy, come to the exact opposite conclusion. 184 Although
the aforementioned language is dicta, 185 both state public employers and
unions should take notice of this early warning by SERB.
Two SERB cases offer compelling arguments in support of giving
deference to arbitration decisions. In In re Upper Arlington Education
Association v. Upper Arlington Board of Education186 (Upper Arlington),
SERB declared the following:
Any party who wishes that the [arbitration] award be reviewed to
determine whether the unfair labor practice issue(s) were adequately
resolved with consideration for due process rights of the parties, must
file a Motion for Review with the Board no later than thirty (30) days
after the award issues. The motion should contain a statement of
reasons why the alleged unfair labor practice should not be dismissed
in view of the award. If a Motion for Review is not timely filed, the
Board will assume the matter has been resolved and dismiss the
ULP. 1
87
Essentially, this means that unless a party to the arbitration objects to the
arbitration decision, SERB should not interfere with the decision. As
expressly stated, absent a Motion for Review filing, SERB will assume
proper resolution and summarily dismiss the ULP. 188 This practice strongly
indicates that SERB will give deference to an arbitration decision. Even
construing the above language liberally does not permit SERB sua sponte
89
to disregard the arbitration decision.
In addition, in the 1993 SERB v. Euclid City School District Board of
Education1'9 decision (Euclid), a unanimous SERB stated that "[a]n
administrative interpretation.. .." Id. at X-637 (quoting Jones Metal Prod. v. Walker, 281
N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ohio 1972)). Furthermore, the court stated that an agency's interpretation "it
should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute
[contract]." Id. at X-637 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)).
Hence, that case in no way supports the idea that when SERB defers to arbitration, it is not
thereafter bound even minimally by the arbitration decision.
184 See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 7.
186 9 OPER 11485, X-445 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board June 30, 1992).
187 Id. at X-446.
188 See id.
189 This phrase means SERB would act on "its own will or motion." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
190 10 OPER 1595, X-519 (Ohio State Employment Relations Board October 13,
1993).
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employee organization should not be permitted to shift the litigation of pure
contract interpretation disputes to SERB .... [T]here would be little
purpose to employers agreeing to such arbitration in contracts if such
clauses could be so easily circumvented." 91 Just as an employee
organization should be prohibited from such action, SERB too should be so
confined. Otherwise, the conclusion is the same-neither party has the
incentive to bind themselves to arbitration if SERB could disregard the
arbitration decision at its whim.
The NLRB has developed its law on deference to arbitration decisions.
The NLRB stated that so long as the employer's action was not meant to
erode the union and was not facially erroneous, but instead was grounded in
a contract privilege and the use of arbitration would resolve both the ULP
and the grievance, then the NLRB should defer to the arbitration clause in
the contract. 192 When the NLRB defers to arbitration, it retains jurisdiction
to insure that the arbitration award resolves the ULP.19 3 This resolution
only requires the contractual issue of the arbitration to be "factually
parallel" to the ULP and that the parties present the arbitrator with facts
relevant to resolve the ULP.194
SERB should take notice of the NLRB's case law and follow suit
accordingly. In light of the above, SERB should either clarify what it meant
by the language used in Youngstown, or SERB should retreat from such an
extreme position. Clearly, in cases where one party files a Motion for
Review with SERB, SERB should give less deference to the arbitrator's
award. 195 However, if the arbitration decision is not challenged by either
party, then SERB should give deference to the arbitration decision. Failure
to do so will erode the incentive for both state public employers and unions
to agree to binding arbitration.
VI. LEGISLATIVE FAILURES THEN AND Now
The problems with O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) are not new. Those
problems began over sixteen years ago when overly ambitious unions
decided to enter the political arena in Ohio by contributing heavily to pro-
union politicians.196 One would not be so naive as to assert that unions
191 Id. at X-519.
192 See Collycr Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
193 See Speilburg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
194 See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
195 See Louis S. Cataland, Note, Binding Arbitration and the NonDelegation Doctrine:
Does Ohio's Collective Bargaining Act Unconstitutionally Delegate Legislative Authority to
Administratively Appointed Arbitrators?, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. REsOL. 83, 96-97 (1990).
196 See supra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
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should have been precluded from entering the political fray. However,
unlike other areas of politics, there existed no counter-balancing lobbying
organization to bring the debate to the center. 197 Quite simply, there existed
no lobbying group for the state public employers because those individuals
had nothing financially or personally to lose-they were agents of the state
with no real vested interest.' 9 8 Only the State of Ohio and the taxpayers of
Ohio stood to lose-and both did.
Today, unions with public-sector employees are the fastest growing
unions in Ohio.199 As noted above, this enormous growth is despite the fact
that Ohio has had a Republican governor for the past six years and a
Republican-controlled legislature for the last three years.2 °0 In a recent
article, Professor Greg Delemeester noted the tremendous growth in public
employee compensation:
On average, state employees... earned $32,276 in 1994, 24.9
percent more than the average worker in the private sector. This
translates into an annual "wage premium" of $6,428 for state
employees. This premium is higher than a decade ago; in 1986, it was
only $1,087, or 5.4 percent .... State-employee wages grew by
54.1 percent from 1986 to 1994. Meanwhile, private-sector wages
grew by only 30.1 percent.
Unions are often able to use collective-bargaining laws to limit
competition for workers and garner higher wages .... All in all, the
public-employee wage premium translates into added costs of about
$411 million.
20 1
197 Lobbying poses unique problems for our republican form of government. In theory,
representatives are supposed to vote in accordance with the majority of voters in their district.
In practice, a strong lobbying effort can "persuade" a representative to vote against the wishes
of his constituents. Some would argue that the constituents could then vote him out of office
in the next election. There are two problems with this argument: (1) it assumes that the voters
are informed (typically, this is done by an opposing lobbying group, but when only one side
is represented by a lobbying group, there is no lobbying group on the other side to inform the
voters) and (2) the damage is done because the legislation is now law. Hence, in situations
involving collective bargaining, only the state public employees will have an active lobby
because they are the only individuals who stand personally to gain or lose anything.
19 8 See infra note 200.
199 See Stephen Phillips, Wading into Battle over Bargaining Law, THE PLAIN DEALER,
June 16, 1996, at A20.
200 See Greg Delemeester, State Employees' Salaries Outstrip Those in Private Sector,
THE CoLUMBUs DISPATcH, July 17, 1996, at 9A.
201 Id.
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Coincidentally, the Collective Bargaining Act became law in 19 8 3 202 and in
1986 would have produced its second round of contracts between public
employers and the various unions.203 Perhaps the unbridled growth in
public employee compensation is a direct result of the pro-union collective
bargaining act. At a taxpayer cost of $411 million, it is a steep price to pay
for political favoritism.
The National Education Association (NEA) vividly illustrates the
resources a union has at its fingertips. The NEA is the national teachers'
union; it has fifty-two state-level affiliates and approximately 13,000 local
level affiliates.204 The NEA collects a fixed proportion of its members
salary in the form of membership dues.205 This arrangement creates an
incentive for the NEA to bargain for increased salaries in order to increase
the amount of money it collects in membership dues.206 In 1992-1993, the
dues collected by the NEA at the national, state and local levels totaled
approximately $750 million.20 7 The NEA also has its own political action
committee that contributed $2.3 million to the congressional elections in
1992.208 As noted above, there exists no lobbying organization in the public
employment sphere to counter-balance the substantial financial and physical
support unions give to political candidates.
This type of unopposed influence worked in 1983 when the unions'
"investments" paid off handsomely as their political allies won and were
then able to fashion one of the most union-friendly collective bargaining
acts in the country.209 As many critics of the collective bargaining
legislation noted, the citizens of Ohio "would have been better served
... if [the legislature] had made some real effort to determine what subjects
should have been effectively removed from the bargaining table-rather than
202 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
203 State public employers and the various unions would have negotiated over the first
contract in 1983. The contracts typically lasted for three years before new rounds of contract
negotiations took place. Hence, the second round of contract negotiations would have
occurred in 1986. Intuitively, both public employers and unions would have learned valuable
lessons from the first round of contract negotiations. However, because unions were
affiliations of national organizations with decades of bargaining experience, the unions could
use seasoned veterans to advise and negotiate the contracts, whereas the state public
employers had no similar affiliations or experience to aid them in the contract negotiations.
204 See Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The National Extortion Association?, FORBs,




208 See id. at 80.
209 See O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 3.
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purporting to remove items from the table with one hand while placing them
back on the table with the other." 210 Such action led to the many years of
problems the state of Ohio has experienced due to the "affects" language in
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C).
Should all the blame for this legislative failure fall on the shoulders of
those politicians from 1983? No. In the summer of 1995, a restructuring bill
known as Senate Bill 162 went before the legislature. As introduced, Senate
Bill 162 contained changes in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) that would have
allowed adjudicatory bodies to interpret O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) as
suggested in this Note.211 These changes would have finally given courts
the power to recognize the concept of inherent management rights because
the new language would have legislatively overturned or mitigated the
Lorain II decision which failed to give O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9)
effect. Hence, SERB could have truly established the concept of inherent
management rights without having to dance around the strict constraints of
the Lorain 1l decision.
However, at some point in the amendment process, the vital changes to
O.R.C. section 4117.08(C) were deleted. 212 With Republicans holding
majorities in the legislature and the governorship, the deletions came as a
huge surprise and disappointment to state public employers. 213 A possible
explanation exists in the campaign contributions received by many
Republican legislators from the unions.
214
210 Bumpass & Ashmus, supra note 37, at 640.
211 I obtained this information from attending several of the legislative sessions in the
summer of 1995 when Senate Bill 162 was under consideration.
212 See id.
213 Many of the Republican legislators that allowed the deletion to O.R.C. § 4117.08
may have done so because they feared retaliation by the unions at the ballot box.
214 As echoed throughout the country today, many politicians from both parties have
become more influenced by the various lobbying groups. This reality causes the general
public to view politics from a jaded perspective. The following list represents a partial
compilation of the contributions made by two unions to Republican politicians for election
purposes:
Ohio Education Association
Republican Senate Campaign Committee $6,000
House Republican Campaign Committee $5,000
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Governor Voinovich also seemed to change his position on the pro-
union collective bargaining bill.215 While he was Mayor of Cleveland,
Governor Voinovich was against the pro-union collective bargaining law;
216
now as Governor of Ohio with United States Senate aspirations, Governor
Voinovich is in favor of the pro-union collective bargaining law.
217
Ironically, just as then Mayor Voinovich believed in the 1980s, current
Cleveland Mayor Michael R. White, a Democrat, is against the collective
bargaining law because it prevents him from exercising inherent
management rights that would save taxpayers approximately one million
dollars a year. 218 In response to union uproar over his position, Mayor
White stated that "[w]e can't be afraid of the political reprisals. Who's
going to stand up for the citizens? Clearly the citizens who are union
members have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo."
219
The Republican legislators and Governor Voinovich may get yet













Republican Senate Campaign Committee S7,600
Senate
Stanley Aronoff $18,000
Official State Records, Ohio Secretary of State, Election Section (1995).
215 See John Chalfant, Fight Brews over Proposed Collective Bargaining Law, THE
REPoSITORY, Oct. 8, 1995, at Ag.
216se, id.
217 Se, id.
218 See Phillips, supra note 199, at Al and A20.
219 Stephen Koff, Labor Takes Protest to the Streets, THE PLAIN DEALR, June 8, 1996,
at Al and A12.
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to show the citizens of Ohio that "business as usual" is not the maxim for
Ohio politicians. Although not yet introduced in either the House of
Representatives or the Senate, a bill exists that would make the necessary
changes to O.R.C. section 4117.08(C). 220 This bill would explicitly remove
the inherent management rights listed in O.R.C. section 4117.08(C)(1)-(9)
from mandatory subjects of bargaining,22 1 finally giving state public
220 If the bill is introduced, then a House Bill Number or a Senate Bill Number will be
assigned for reference purposes. See generally J. Kenneth Blackwell, Public Employee
Bargaining Requires Balance, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 1997, at 7A.
221 Currently, O.R.C. § 4117.08 is written in the proposed bill as follows:
Sec. 4117.08.
(A) All nmtters pertaining to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment are subject to collective bargaining between the public employer
and the exclusive representative, except as otherwise specified in this
section.
(B) The conduct and grading of civil service examinations, the rating of
candidates, the establishment of eligible lists from the examinations, and the
original appointments from the eligible lists are not appropriate subjects for
collective bargaining. For purposes of this section, "Original Appointment"
means the first appointment of a public employee to a position with a new
appointing authority, and does not include any subsequent promotion,
reduction, or transfer to another position.
(C) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, unless a public employer
agrees otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement, nothing in Chapter
4117 of the Revised Code impairs the right and responsibility of each public
employer to :
(1) Determine matters of inherent managerial policy
which include, but are not limited to areas of
discretion or policy such as functions and programs
of the public employer, standards of services, its
overall budget, utilization of technology, and
organizational structure;
(2) Direct, supervise, evaluate, or hire employees;
(3) Maintain and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of governmental operations;
(4) Determine the overall methods, process, means,
or personnel by which governmental operations are to
be conducted;
(5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just
cause, or lay off, transfer, assign, schedule, promote,
or retain employees;
(6) Determine the adequacy of the work force;
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employers the inherent management rights they should have received back
in 1983.
The bottom line is that without legislative action, the ineffectual
interpretation in the Youngstown decision will remain the law. State public
employers may one day see the long-awaited arrival of inherent management
rights beyond the reach of unions to challenge and SERB to curtail. Until
that time comes, state public employers should learn a few magic tricks of
their own to deal with SERB's sleights of hand and the legislature's
inaction.
(7) Determine the overall mission of the employer as
unit of government;
(8) Effectively manage the work force;
(9) Take actions to carry out the mission of the public
employer as a governmental unit;
(10) Contract with any public or private entity to
provide services.
(D) The employer is not required to bargain collectively on subjects reserved
to the management and direction of the governmental unit except with
respect to the substantial effects the employer's decisions will have on wages,
hours, or other substantial terms and conditions of employment. Any
reasonably foreseeable, substantial effects on wages, hours, or other
substantial terms and conditions of employment arising from the employer's
decisions shall be bargained as soon as practicable. If the employee
organization makes a timely request to bargain collectively and it is
reasonably practicable to do so, the parties must make a good faith attempt to
bargain collectively the substantial effects prior to the implementation of the
employer's decisions. However, a public employer may implement its
decisions before resolving all of the substantial effects on wages, hours, and
other substantial terms and conditions of employment. Nothing in this
division shall be construed to permit any party to amend the written
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement during its term without
consent of the parties to the agreement.
Where a collective bargaining makes no specification about subject
matter, the employer has reserved exclusively all of the inherent rights and
authority to make decisions in order to manage and operate its facilities and
programs regarding that subject matter.
(E) A public employee or exclusive representative may raise a legitimate
complaint or file a grievance based on the collective bargaining agreement.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Youngstown decision poses some continued problems, and
possibly some new problems, for state public employers and unions.
Although Youngstown appears to be more favorable to the concept of
inherent management rights, stripping away the semantics of the decision
reveals that state public employers still do not possess inherent management
rights beyond the reach of unions and SERB. Likewise, SERB's position
that arbitration decisions are due no deference is highly troublesome. SERB
should clarify this position in the future to assure both state public
employers and unions that arbitration is worthwhile. Without assurance by
SERB, the incentive to arbitrate is seriously undermined.
As for the legislative failures of the past and present, the citizens of
Ohio should demand fairness in collective bargaining between state public
employers and unions by supporting candidates more concerned about
equity in collective bargaining than with their own reelection. Thus, while
unions and state public employees make off into the forest with Ohio tax
dollars, the legislature fails even to see the forest because the next election
is in the way.
Now do you understand?
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